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4.1 Introduction
The judgment delivered by Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court on
14 March 2012 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo1 was
welcomed by a number of experts as a landmark decision.2 Not only was the
judgment the first ever adopted by the Court, thus marking a new step in the
operationalization of the Rome Statute, but it also provided an opportunity for
addressing a number of procedural and substantive issues that are essential to the
progressive development of both international criminal and humanitarian law.
This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of all these
issues.3 It focuses instead on the core of the judgment, i.e., the definitions of the
war crimes for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted (Sect. 4.3). The Trial
Chamber found that the accused was guilty of conscripting and enlisting children
under 15 into an armed group, namely the Forces Patriotiques Pour la Libération
du Congo (UPC/FPLC), and of using them to participate actively in hostilities.
These crimes occurred in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
from September 2002 to August 2003. This article also examines how the Trial
Chamber addressed the preliminary question of the characterization of the situa-
tion during the relevant period (Sect. 4.2). The judgment provides essential insight
into the Trial Chamber’s understanding of the notion of armed conflict within the
framework of the Rome Statute.
4.2 Characterization of the Situation
A detailed part of the Lubanga judgment analyzed the nature of the context in
which the relevant facts occurred. The Trial Chamber looked into whether the
situation could be characterized as an armed conflict, and if so, whether this conflict
should be classified as international or non-international. This is a necessary pre-
requisite for determining whether the jurisdiction of the Court extended to cover the
facts of the case, and also, which of the two potentially relevant Articles of the
Rome Statute applied to the situation. The Chamber stressed that ‘‘[t]he relevant
1 International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/
06-2842.
2 See, e.g., Committee on the Rights of the Child, Press statement—Committee on the Rights of
the Child welcomes the ICC ruling in the Lubanga Case, Geneva, 15 March 2012; Office of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, SRSG
Coomaraswamy welcomes the International Criminal Court’s first verdict—the conviction of
Thomas Lubanga for child recruitment, 14 March 2012.
3 For a comprehensive review of the legal issues addressed in the Lubanga judgment, see Ambos
2012, pp. 115–153.
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Elements of Crimes require that the alleged criminal conduct ‘took place in the
context of and was associated with an […] armed conflict’’’ (para 531).
The Trial Chamber embarked on its analysis by first employing interpretative
efforts to clarify the notion of armed conflict. It recalled the fact that neither the
Rome Statute nor the Elements of Crimes provide a definition of this notion (para
531). Likewise, there is no such definition under existing treaties of international
humanitarian law, although the existence of an armed conflict is required to trigger
the application of these treaties, setting limits as to their scope of application (para
532). The Trial Chamber then turned to international jurisprudence seeking further
guidance on this matter, and paid special attention to the case law of the ICTY.
The Trial Chamber endorsed, in particular, the Tribunal’s well-known definition,
which states that ‘‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’’ (para 533).4 This
definition has been used by a number of other international bodies since,5 and its
adoption in the Lubanga judgment further confirms a now well-established trend.
Having established this broader framework, the Trial Chamber then developed
a more detailed analysis in three main steps: it reaffirmed the legal basis for
distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts (Sect.
4.2.1); it examined whether the context of the case under consideration represented
a non-international armed conflict, in which case Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome
Statute would apply (Sect. 4.2.2); after responding positively to the previous
question, it evaluated whether the intervention of foreign forces during the period
under examination had ‘‘internationalized’’ the conflict, in which case Article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute would apply (Sect. 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Categories of Armed Conflicts
The distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts, which
dates back to the origin of the law of armed conflicts, has been challenged by
scholars on a number of occasions.6 In this debate, the Trial Chamber took a very
clear position. It stated that ‘‘the international/non-international distinction is not
only an established part of the international law of armed conflict, but more
importantly it is enshrined in the relevant statutory provisions of the Rome Statute
framework’’ (para 539). The Trial Chamber did not rely solely on the Rome
Statute to support this statement (which would have been sufficient for the
4 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case no. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 70.
5 See, e.g., Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, Report pursuant to Human Rights Council
resolution S-2/1, A/HRC/3/2, 23 November 2006, para 51; ICRC 2008.
6 See., e.g., Dupuy and Leonetti 1979, p. 258; Reisman and Silk 1988, p. 465. More recently, see
also Stewart 2003, pp. 313–349.
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purposes of its judgment), but it also insisted that the distinction is a fundamental
feature of international humanitarian law. Despite the growing convergence of the
two legal frameworks governing each category of armed conflict, significant dif-
ferences indeed remain. The most important difference relates to the combatant
privilege, which only applies in international armed conflicts. Those enjoying this
privilege are entitled to immunity from domestic prosecution for lawful acts of
war. If captured by the enemy, they are considered prisoners of war and, as such,
must be released and repatriated without delay after the end of hostilities.7 They
are not, however, immune from prosecution for war crimes and other violations of
international humanitarian law. In non-international armed conflicts, combatant
privilege does not exist. Those participating in hostilities remain subject to pros-
ecution for violations of domestic law even if they fully respect the rules of
international humanitarian law.
Pursuing this reasoning, the Trial Chamber also recognized that different types
of armed conflicts may occur at the same time and on the same territory,
depending on the nature of the parties involved in particular confrontations (para
540). If, for instance, foreign States become involved in an existing non-interna-
tional armed conflict, any of the following different scenarios may be envisaged:
Fighting may take place between the forces of the territorial State and those of an
intervening State, between intervening States taking action on both sides of the
front line, between government forces (of the territorial State or of a third State)
and non-governmental armed groups or between such groups only. In other words,
as the Trial Chamber confirmed, international and non-international armed con-
flicts may ‘‘coexist’’ within the same territory (para 540). The Trial Chamber thus
implicitly recognized that different legal frameworks may apply to the distinct
conflicts occurring in such situations. Inter-State confrontations are governed by
the law of international armed conflict, whereas other scenarios are subject to the
law of non-international armed conflict.
This approach is based on well-established international jurisprudence. The
Trial Chamber itself invoked the judgment of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case (1986) (para 540, note 1644), which laid the basis for
the theory of a fragmented application of international humanitarian law. In its
analysis of the conflict, the ICJ differentiated between, on the one hand, the
conflict opposing the Nicaraguan government and the armed opposition
(‘‘the Contras’’) and, on the other, the conflict opposing that same government and
the United States of America.8 Other international bodies, such as the ICTY, have
applied this theory since then.9
7 GCIII, Article 118(1).
8 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para 219. See Vité 2009, p. 86.
9 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, para 84. A number of
scholars also support this approach (see Schindler 1982, pp. 255–264).
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This approach suggests that foreign intervention in a purely internal armed
conflict would not necessarily automatically confer an international character on
such a conflict. The classification of the situation in this case will depend on the
relationship between the intervening troops and the non-state armed groups that
are parties to the conflict, and on the degree of influence the former may poten-
tially exert over the latter. This is a key issue that the Trial Chamber further
analyzed in another part of the judgment (see Sect. 4.2.3). However, before
addressing this question, the Trial Chamber first assessed whether there was, in
actual fact, an armed conflict of a non-international character occurring on the
territory during the relevant period.
4.2.2 Non-international Armed Conflict
For this purpose, the Trial Chamber began its reasoning by providing its under-
standing of the notion of non-international armed conflicts within the meaning of
Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute. This is the provision that sets out the scope of
application of the previous paragraph of the Statute (Article 8(2)(e)), which itself
enumerates a list of serious violations of the laws and customs of war, including
the conscription and enlistment of children under 15 into armed forces or groups,
or their use to participate actively in hostilities (Article 8(2)(e)(vii)). Article 8(2)(f)
states that the armed conflicts to which it applies are those ‘‘that take place in the
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups’’.
To fully understand this paragraph, it must be compared to Article 8(2)(d) of the
Rome Statute, which defines the scope of application of another set of war crimes,
namely ‘‘serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949’’ (Article 8(2)(c)). While both provisions deal with offences
committed during ‘‘armed conflicts not of an international character’’, Article
8(2)(f), unlike Article 8(2)(d), requires an additional element, stating that such
conflict must be ‘‘protracted’’.10 This difference between the two provisions gives
rise to the question of whether Article 8(2)(f), by referring explicitly to the cri-
terion of duration (‘‘protracted armed conflict’’), merely clarifies the terms of para
(2)(d), without creating a separate category of armed conflict, or whether it instead
applies to a distinct category of non-international armed conflict, thus defining a
distinct field of application for the list of crimes in Article 8(2)(e). This question
has been debated amongst scholars, who hold diverging views on the matter.11
10 For an analysis of the notion of non-international armed conflict under both provisions, see
Dörmann Dörmann 2003, pp. 384–389 and 441–442.
11 For a reminder of this debate, see Schabas 2010, pp. 205–206; Vité 2009, pp. 80–83;
Sivakumaran 2009, pp. 371–380.
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While it did not address this question directly, the Trial Chamber did make a
number of comments, which serve to shed new light on this debate. It is important
to note in this regard that the Chamber referred to Additional Protocol II governing
non-international armed conflicts12 as the main source for interpreting Article
8(2)(f). This is a coherent approach as this provision relates to a list of war crimes,
which, to a certain extent, amount to violations of the Protocol. By contrast,
Article 8(2)(d), as previously mentioned, focuses on serious violations of Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Chamber’s approach is also
consistent with the drafting history of the Rome Statute. Article 8(2)(f) was
originally conceived as a provision covering serious violations of Additional
Protocol II. Explicit reference to the Protocol in the draft text of the provision was
replaced during the negotiations with the notion of ‘‘protracted armed conflict’’.13
This would therefore suggest that both Additional Protocol II and Article 8(2)(f)
have an identical scope of application.
Although it adopted this approach, the Trial Chamber did not seem completely
at ease with this reasoning. While referring to Additional Protocol II as the main
legal source for interpreting Article 8(2)(f), it immediately stressed that this pro-
vision ‘‘only requires the existence of a ‘protracted’ conflict between ‘organised
armed groups’’’ (para 536). This implies that elements of the restrictive scope of
application of Additional Protocol II should not be transposed to Article 8(2)(f). In
the Chamber’s views, these elements include the requirements that organized
armed groups involved in the conflict must be ‘‘under responsible command’’ and
‘‘exercise such control over a part of [the] territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’’ (para
536).14 It is surprising in this respect that the Trial Chamber did not mention
another restrictive element, namely that Additional Protocol II only applies to
armed conflicts opposing State armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups. The Protocol does not extend to armed conflicts between
such groups only. The Trial Chamber however implicitly admitted that this
restrictive element is not part of Article 8(2)(f), when it referred to the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY as an additional source for clarifying the notion of armed
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949a, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
13 The wording of para (2)(f) is the outcome a compromise between delegations in favor of
introducing a list of war crimes applicable to non-international armed conflicts and those against
the introduction of such a list. An initial proposal in the direction of such a compromise was
submitted by the ‘Bureau of the Committee of the Whole’ and consisted of limiting the field of
application of the crimes mentioned in para (2)(e) by taking up the restrictive criteria elaborated
in Article 1(2) of APII (A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59). As an agreement could not be reached on that
proposal, Sierra Leone suggested the text of para (2)(f) that was ultimately retained, with a
reference to the notion of ‘‘protracted armed conflict’’. The aim was to appease the delegations
that were reluctant to introduce war crimes into the law of non-international armed conflict, while
avoiding a threshold of application as high as that in APII. Other delegations were indeed
opposed to inserting such a threshold in the Rome Statute (A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, para 8).
14 Additional Protocol II, Article 1(1).
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conflict for the purposes of the Rome Statute. The Tribunal has indeed clearly
stated that non-international armed conflicts include those that involve ‘‘protracted
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State’’ (emphasis added).15
Thus, while relying on Article 1 of Additional Protocol II as the main source for
interpreting Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber nonetheless set
aside some of the specificities of the Protocol, i.e., those requirements that result in
a narrow scope of application of this instrument. It would seem that the Trial
Chamber felt obliged to refer to Additional Protocol II in order to be consistent
with the internal structure and drafting history of Article 8 of the Rome Statute, but
that it simultaneously sought to ensure that both sub-para 2(d) and 2(f) of this
provision are understood to address the same types of situations. Indeed Article 1
of Additional Protocol II without its restrictive elements has the same scope of
application as Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The
Trial Chamber’s reasoning would therefore seem to support the views of those
who consider that there is no difference between the thresholds of application of
the two sub-paragraphs of the Rome Statute discussed above.
This conclusion is further confirmed in looking at the criteria used by the Trial
Chamber to determine whether the situation under consideration actually
amounted to an armed conflict in the sense of Article 8(2)(f). The Chamber stated
that two conditions must be fulfilled in this regard, namely a certain level of
‘‘intensity’’, and the involvement of ‘‘organized armed groups’’ (para 536). In
order to assess each of these conditions, the Chamber identified ‘‘factors’’ which
could be potentially relevant, but which are not, in themselves, sine qua non
requirements for determining the existence of intensity and organization. These
factors include, for instance, the ‘‘command structure and rules’’ of a group, or its
‘‘ability to plan military operations and put them in effect’’ (organization). They
also include ‘‘the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes’’,
or ‘‘their spread over territory and over a period of time’’ (intensity) (paras
537–538). These two conditions and the related factors are taken from the juris-
prudence of the ICTY to which the Trial Chamber makes explicit reference.16 Yet
these criteria were developed by the Tribunal in order to distinguish non-inter-
national armed conflicts ‘‘from banditry, unorganised and short–lived insurrec-
tions, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian
law’’.17 They relate to all forms of non-international armed conflicts, and as such,
15 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 70.
16 The Trial Chamber explains that the lists of factors provided in its judgment are not
exhaustive. Other factors may be found in case law of the ICTY. See ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Boškoski et al., IT- 04-82, Trial Judgment, 10 July 2008, paras 173–206. See also ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, 30 November 2005, paras 83–174; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84-T, Trial Judgment, 3 April 2008, paras 37–60.
17 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., ibid., para 84.
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are not meant to define a specific category among these conflicts corresponding to
a higher threshold of application.18
As for the facts, the Trial Chamber noted that the military wing of the Forces
Patriotiques Pour la Libération du Congo (UPC/FPLC), the armed group for
which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was commander-in-chief, ‘‘was organised with a
leadership structure that was capable of training troops as well as imposing dis-
cipline, and it carried out sustained military operations in Ituri during the relevant
timeframe’’ (para 543). It further noted that the FPLC had been engaged in pro-
longed hostilities against other organized armed groups during the period of the
charges (paras 544–547). Lastly, the Trial Chamber remarked that no ‘‘peaceful
settlement’’ between the parties had been reached despite international efforts to
put an end to the conflict (para 548). It therefore concluded that the conditions
necessary to classify these confrontations as a non-international armed conflict
were fulfilled during the relevant period (para 550).
However, the characterization of the situation in the Lubanga judgment did not
end with this analysis. The Trial Chamber went further, with a view to determining
whether the involvement of foreign forces had affected the nature of the situation,
potentially turning it into an international armed conflict.
4.2.3 Internationalization of a Non-international Armed
Conflict
An international armed conflict19 may occur in two different ways: (i) when States
directly resort to armed force against each other; and (ii) when a State exercises a
sufficient amount of control over a non-state armed group, which is itself a party to
an armed conflict involving another State. The Trial Chamber, citing Pre Trial
Chamber II, in this way noted that ‘‘an international armed conflict exists in case of
armed hostilities between States through their respective armed forces or other
actors acting on behalf of the State’’ (para 541).
Though the formulation of the Trial Chamber is correct in distinguishing these
two forms of international armed conflict, the statement that such situations are
characterized by ‘‘armed hostilities’’ may be misleading, as this may be interpreted
as requiring an excessively high threshold of violence. The general view is that
international armed conflicts, as opposed to non-international armed conflicts, do
not require a particular threshold of armed violence to be reached. The ICRC
commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 defines an international armed
conflict as ‘‘[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the
18 This conclusion was already anticipated by Sivakumaran on the basis of the decision of the
Pre-Trial Chamber I on the confirmation of charges; see Sivakumaran 2009, pp. 377–380.
19 Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(a) and (b).
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intervention of armed forces’’.20 It further explains that ‘‘[i]t makes no difference
how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place’’.21 The ICTY also
reminds us that an international armed conflict exists, ‘‘whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States’’.22 The Tribunal further specifies that ‘‘le recours à
la force armée entre Etats suffit en soi à déclencher l’application du droit inter-
national humanitaire’’.23 It is true however, that this position has recently been
challenged. Some argue that a distinction must be made between international
armed conflicts (reaching a certain level of intensity) and other expressions of
hostility between States, such as minor ‘‘incidents’’, ‘‘border clashes’’ or
‘‘skirmishes’’.24 The Trial Chamber could therefore have expounded on its views
on this issue, given its use of the phrase ‘‘armed hostilities between States’’.
It is not disputed however, that an assessment of the level of violence is nec-
essary to determine whether foreign intervention has led to internationalization of
internal armed conflicts. In such cases, the characterization of the situation as an
international armed conflict requires the following two steps: first, it must be
shown that the conditions of ‘‘organization’’ and ‘‘intensity’’ necessary to establish
the existence of a non-international armed conflict have been met; second, it must
be demonstrated that the level of control exercised by foreign forces over an
organized armed group is sufficient to conclude that the conflict is, in fact, a
confrontation between States. In other words, the classification of such a situation
as an international armed conflict supposes a pre-existing non-international armed
conflict, which in turn implies that the required threshold of intensity has been met.
As for the nature of the control exercised over the armed group, the Trial
Chamber relied fully on the criteria developed by the ICTY. The Chamber con-
sidered that ‘‘the ‘overall control’ test is the correct approach’’ (para 541). Quoting
the ICTY, it confirmed that the armed conflict becomes international when the
foreign State ‘‘has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military
actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or
providing operational support to that group’’ (para 541).25
Regarding the facts, the Trial Chamber noted that there were a number of
simultaneous conflicts in the region during the period covered by the charges,
some of them including the UPC/FPLC (para 543). It considered, however, that
20 Pictet 1952, p. 32. This sentence was also quoted by Pre-Trial Chamber I in the confirmation
of charges. (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007, para 207).
21 Pictet 1952, p. 32. For further details on the notion of international armed conflict in
international criminal law, see Dörmann 2003, pp. 23–28.
22 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 70.
23 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (‘‘Čelebići Camp’’), IT-96-21, Trial Judgment, 16
November 1998, para 184.
24 This view was most notably developed in International Law Association 2010, pp. 28–32.
25 This quote comes from ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July
1999, para 137 (emphasis in the original).
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there was no sufficient evidence supporting the view that the UPC/FPLC had acted
under the ‘‘overall control’’ of any of the States involved in the relevant conflicts,
namely Uganda, Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (paras
551–567).26 It thus concluded that ‘‘[s]ince the conflict to which the UPC/FPLC
was a party was not ‘a difference arising between two states’ but rather protracted
violence carried out by multiple non-state armed groups, it remained a non-
international conflict notwithstanding any concurrent international armed conflict
between Uganda and the DRC’’ (para 563). With this statement, the Trial Chamber
changed the legal characterization of the facts adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber I
when confirming the charges. The latter had concluded that the conflict had been
internationalized through the occupation of the Ituri region by the Ugandan army
until 2 June 2003.27
4.3 Protection of Children Under 15
The most innovative developments in the Lubanga judgment relate to the crimi-
nalization of acts that seek to involve children as participants in armed conflict.
The Trial Chamber undertook an in-depth analysis of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the
Rome Statute, which states: ‘‘2. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’
means: […] (e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework
of international law, namely, any of the following acts: […] (vii) Conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or
using them to participate actively in hostilities; […]’’(emphasis added).28
A large part of the judgment is dedicated to clarifying the meaning of the three
types of criminal conduct referred to in this provision, and to assessing the extent
to which these acts might be interconnected. To begin its analysis, the Trial
Chamber recalled that the three relevant concepts are not defined in the Statutes,
the Rules of Procedure or Evidence or the Elements of Crimes (para 600). The
Trial Chamber therefore first endeavoured to provide its interpretation of the
notions of conscripting and enlisting children under 15, and examined the relation
between these two notions and the third, namely using children to participate
actively in hostilities (Sect. 4.3.1). Secondly, the Trial Chamber provided its own
26 This assessment has been questioned by K. Ambos. The author stresses that the Trial Chamber
has itself recognized that parties to the non-international armed conflict had received support
from States, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo (providing support to the Armée du
people congolais (APC)) and Uganda and Rwanda (providing support to the UPC/FPLC) (see
Judgment, paras 553 and 554, 558) (Ambos 2012, pp. 115–153).
27 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007, para 220.
28 For detailed analyses of this provision, see Happold 2009 and Kurth 2010.
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understanding of the third notion, and proposed new criteria for identifying those
activities that amount to ‘‘active participation in hostilities’’ (Sect. 4.3.2).
With these objectives in view, the Trial Chamber recalled that the legal sources
for interpreting Article 8(2)(e)(vii), as stipulated in Article 21 of the Statute,
include ‘‘the established principles of the international law of armed conflict’’
adding that such interpretation must be ‘‘consistent with internationally recognized
human rights’’ (para 600). More specifically, the Trial Chamber announced that it
would rely on Article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II and Article 38 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child. Both instruments prohibit the recruitment of
children under 15 and their participation in hostilities, although in different terms.
Under the Protocol, all forms of participation in hostilities are prohibited without
further specification, while the Convention only bans ‘‘direct’’ participation in
hostilities.29
4.3.1 Conscripting or Enlisting Children into Armed Forces
or Groups
With a view to clarifying the concepts of conscription and enlistment under Article
8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber examined how these concepts
relate to two other notions, namely ‘‘recruitment’’ (Sect. 4.3.1.1) and ‘‘use to
participate actively in hostilities’’ (Sect. 4.3.1.2).
4.3.1.1 ‘‘Conscripting or Enlisting’’ Versus ‘‘Recruiting’’
The Trial Chamber endorsed the definition proposed by Pre-Trial Chamber I,30
according to which ‘‘‘conscription’ and ‘enlistment’ are both forms of recruitment,
in that they refer to the incorporation of a boy or a girl under the age of 15 into an
armed group, whether coercively (conscription) or voluntarily (enlistment)’’ (para
607). This definition indicates that there is no difference between the material
scope of application of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) and that of the corresponding provisions
of international humanitarian law and human rights law. ‘‘Conscripting’’ and
‘‘enlisting’’ are both forms of ‘‘recruitment’’, which is the notion used in these two
legal frameworks, most notably in Additional Protocol II (Article 4(3)(c)) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 38(2)).31 This is further confirmed
29 Article 4(3)(c) of APII reads: ‘‘children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities’’. Article
38(2) of CRC reads: ‘‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities’’.
30 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007, para 246.
31 International practice also shows that this prohibition has crystallized into customary
international law, binding both States and non-state parties to armed conflicts. See Henckaerts
4 Between Consolidation and Innovation 71
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-924-5_4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Bilkent University Library, on 11 Jul 2018 at 11:44:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
by the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol II, which states that ‘‘[t]he
principle of non-recruitment also prohibits accepting voluntary enlistment’’.32 The
three bodies of law concerned therefore address the same practice, i.e. all forms of
recruitment of children, even though different wording is used in the Rome Statute.
There is no gap in the material scope of application of the rules prohibiting and
punishing such conduct.33
While neither international humanitarian law nor human rights law envision
consent-based recruitment of children under 15, the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict (OP-CAC) takes this practice into account for older children. This
instrument prohibits States Parties from ‘‘compulsorily’’34 recruiting children
under 18, but allows ‘‘voluntary recruitment’’ of such children under certain
conditions.35 The OP-CAC therefore follows the example of the Rome Statute in
establishing two categories of recruitment.36 It is not clear however whether these
categories are fully identical under each of these instruments. While the OP-CAC
refers to ‘‘compulsory’’ recruitment, the Trial Chamber preferred the notion of
‘‘coercive’’ recruitment. The Chamber did suggest however that both notions
should have the same meaning in this context, stressing that the distinctive
characteristic of conscription (as compared to enlistment) is ‘‘the added element of
compulsion’’ (para 608) (emphasis added).
Concerning recruitment by non-state armed groups, however, the OP-CAC does
not provide for such a distinction based on consent. It states that these groups
‘‘should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under
(Footnote 31 continued)
and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 482–485. For a different view on the notions used in the Rome
Statute, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Robertson of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, who
declared that ‘‘‘(r)ecruitment’ is a term which implies some active soliciting of ‘recruits’, i.e., to
pressure or induce them to enlist: it is not synonymous with ‘enlistment’’’ (Special Court for
Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR729E, Decision on pre-
liminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
Opinion, para 27).
32 Sandoz et al. 1987, para 4557.
33 K. Ambos explains in this regard that ‘‘the interplay between (voluntary) enlistment and
(compulsory) conscription prevents a punishability gap since any form of child recruitment
(voluntary or not) is covered by the offence’’, Ambos Ambos 2012, p. 134. In this sense, see also
Happold 2009, p. 587.
34 OP-CAC, Article 2.
35 For more details on the conditions and limits of voluntary recruitment by States into armed
forces under the OP-CAC, see Article 3.
36 A similar distinction also exists under ILO Convention 182 concerning the prohibition and
immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (1999). This Convention
mentions among the different forms of the worst forms of child labor ‘‘all forms of slavery or
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom
and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use
in armed conflict’’ (emphasis added) (Article 3(a)).
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the age of 18 years’’.37 It allows no exception to the ‘‘straight 18 rule’’, although
the exact implications of this rule have been discussed.38 The OP-CAC further
requires States Parties to take all feasible measures to prohibit and criminalize
such practices by non-state armed groups.39
As for the reasons for separating ‘‘conscription’’ and ‘‘enlistment’’ of children
in the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber raised a somewhat audacious question. It
examined whether the distinction between the two forms of recruitment is actually
relevant for the purpose of criminal prosecution. External experts consulted on this
question during the procedure gave a clear answer. One of them explained that
‘‘from a psychological point of view, children cannot give ‘informed’ consent
when joining an armed group, because they have a limited understanding of the
consequences of their choices; they do not control or fully comprehend the
structures and forces they are dealing with; and they have inadequate knowledge
and understanding of the short- and long-term consequences of their actions’’ (para
610). Perhaps even more categorically, the UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for children and armed conflict clearly considers that ‘‘the line
between voluntary and forced recruitment is […] not only legally irrelevant but
practically superficial in the context of children in armed conflict’’ (para 612).
According to these experts, there is therefore no such thing as voluntary recruit-
ment of children under 15. Any incorporation of such children into armed forces or
groups therefore entails, to a certain extent, some form of coercion or deception.
While claiming to endorse these views, the Trial Chamber adopted a less
straightforward position, creating confusion on the issue. On the one hand, it held
that ‘‘it will frequently be the case that girls and boys under the age of 15 will be
unable to give genuine and informed consent when enlisting in an armed group or
force’’ (para 613). The Chamber therefore implied that, although ‘‘frequent’’, this
is not necessarily always the case. It seemed to support the view that it may be
possible in practice for children under 15 to genuinely consent to their recruitment.
It thus suggested that the distinction between conscription and enlistment in the
Statute is actually relevant.
On the other hand, the Chamber also declared that ‘‘the consent of a child to his
or her recruitment does not provide an accused with a valid defence’’ (para 617).40
The Chamber seemed to refer here to recruitment taken as a whole, irrespective of
the two subcategories mentioned in Article 8(2)(b)(vii). This statement indicates
that even though consent may be used in a specific case as a valid defense for the
crime of conscription, as the lack of agreement is a constitutive part of the offense,41
37 OP-CAC, Article 4.
38 The nature of this prohibition, whether legally binding or not under the OP-CAC, has been
debated. See Vité 2011, pp. 27–28.
39 For further details on the OP-CAC, see Vandewiele 2006.
40 This is also the position adopted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See for instance
Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 28 May 2008, para 140.
41 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Ambos 2012, pp. 134–136.
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those responsible for the incorporation of children into armed forces or groups
would have to be prosecuted and punished anyway for enlistment.42 The distinction
based on the consent of the child thus does not appear to be relevant for the purpose
of the judgment on the merits. It is significant in this regard that the Trial Chamber
did not differentiate between conscription and enlistment when examining the facts
of the case (para 759). It declared that the difference may be taken into consider-
ation only at the following stage of the procedure, i.e., when determining the
sentence and reparations (para 617).43 The Trial Chamber therefore followed a
more nuanced approach than the experts. It considered that free consent to
recruitment by children under 15 is actually possible, although irrelevant in
deciding whether the accused has committed a crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vii).
4.3.1.2 ‘‘Conscripting or Enlisting’’ Versus ‘‘Using to Participate
Actively in Hostilities’’
After emphasizing the close connection between the first two key concepts of
Article 8(2)(e)(vii), the Trial Chamber examined the relation between these con-
cepts and a third, namely the use of children under 15 to participate actively in
hostilities. More precisely, the Chamber raised the question of whether the three
offenses are characterized by a common purpose, i.e., the active participation of
children in hostilities. It noted that the Rome Statute is not clear in this regard, as
the last part of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) (‘‘to participate actively in hostilities’’) could be
interpreted as relating either to the three notions as a whole or to the last one only
(‘‘use’’). Choosing the first interpretation, as suggested by the defense,44 would
considerably restrict the scope of application of the provision. In practice, children
are very often recruited for purposes other than actual involvement in combat. The
Trial Chamber suggested however, that the Elements of Crimes provides further
guidance in this regard, as they draw a clearer separation between conscripting and
42 See Graf 2012, p. 956.
43 In its decision on the sentence of 10 July 2012, the Trial Chamber did not elaborate on this
question (Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute,
ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, 10 July 2012). It simply indicated that criteria to assess the gravity of the
crimes that were committed and thus to determine the sentence include ‘‘the nature of the
unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime’’ (para 44). On this basis,
Thomas Lubanga received different sentences for the crimes of conscripting and enlisting
children under 15, respectively 13 and 12 years’ imprisonment. In this gradation, the use of these
children to participate actively in hostilities was considered the most serious crime and the related
sentence was fixed at 14 years’ imprisonment (para 98). These differences in sentencing were
however criticized by Judge Odio Benito in her dissenting opinion annexed to the decision of 10
July 2012 (paras 24–27).
44 The defense defines enlistment as ‘‘integration of a person as a soldier, within the context of
an armed conflict, for the purposes of participating actively in the hostilities on behalf of the
group’’ (ICC-01/04-01/06-2773-RED-tENG, para 34).
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enlisting on the one hand and using children to participate actively in hostilities on
the other. The first two offences are mentioned without further specification
regarding their purpose, while active participation in hostilities is presented as a
constitutive element of the third one only. The Chamber therefore concluded that
‘‘the status of a child under 15 who has been enlisted or conscripted is independent
of any later period when he or she may have been ‘used’ to participate actively in
hostilities, particularly given the variety of tasks that he or she may subsequently
be required to undertake. Although it may often be the case that the purpose behind
conscription and enlistment is to use children in hostilities, this is not a require-
ment of the Rome Statute’’ (para 609, see also para 620).45 While the conclusion
reached by the Trial Chamber is correct, the added value of resorting to the
Elements of Crimes in this respect is not obvious. This instrument simply repeats
what is already clear in the Rome Statute. The latter separates the different
offences by using the word ‘‘or’’, as explained by the Chamber itself in the
beginning of its reasoning.46 The argument could therefore have been based on the
plain wording of the Statute.
The Trial Chamber’s conclusion, however, is extremely important for two main
reasons. First it avoids any loopholes in the legal protection of children under 15
against conscription or enlistment. It ensures that all forms of recruitment can
actually be prosecuted, whatever the purpose of the incorporation of the children
into military structures. This position is in line with recent developments in
international law related to the prevention of this phenomenon. A comprehensive
approach to recruitment is followed most notably in the Principles and Guidelines
on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles
2007). The use of the word ‘‘associated’’ in this instrument is intended to
encompass all possible reasons for which children are integrated into armed forces
or groups in practice. The Paris Principles apply to all children (in this case ‘‘any
person less than 18 years of age in accordance with the Convention on the Rights
of the Child’’47) who have been recruited or used ‘‘in any capacity, including but
not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers,
spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has
taken a direct part in hostilities’’.48 Even though the Trial Chamber does not use
the notion of ‘‘association’’ with armed forces or groups in its judgment,49 its
understanding of conscription and enlistment mirrors the definition given in the
Paris Principles.50
45 See Graf 2012, p. 959.
46 On the same line, see Ambos 2012, p. 133.
47 Paris Principles, para 2.0.
48 Ibid., para 2.1.
49 The Trial Chamber discusses the notion of association ‘‘with armed conflict’’ only (para 606).
50 The Trial Chamber does not however answer the question whether recruitment for sexual
purpose is included in Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute. Under the Paris Principles recruitment
for such purpose is explicitly considered a form of ‘‘association’’ with armed forces or groups
covered by the scope of application of this instrument.
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The second reason that the Trial Chamber’s interpretation is so important in
practice is related to the third crime mentioned in Article 8(2)(e)(vii). The
Chamber explains that the prohibition of the ‘‘use’’ of children for their active
participation in hostilities does not require their previous conscription or enlist-
ment (para 620). This means that seeking support from ‘‘civilians’’ under 15, i.e.,
children who are not members of armed forces or groups, for combat operations
may amount to a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. This
happens in practice for instance when a boy or a girl living in the area of the
hostilities is required, with or without coercion, to provide intelligence to the
belligerents.
Thus, the recognition that both forms of recruitment on the one hand, and the
‘‘use’’ of children on the other, are separate offences ensures maximum protection
for children against any form of involvement in military activities. This includes
protection against recruitment for purposes other than combat, as well as against
active participation in hostilities without previous incorporation into armed forces
or groups.
4.3.2 Using Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities
The need to ensure the most comprehensive protection possible for children
involved in armed conflict is also reflected in the reasoning that the Trial Chamber
developed concerning the third offence of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute.
The Chamber stressed that the crime of using children to participate actively in
hostilities encompasses a range of activities, which are not limited to involvement
in actual fighting. Quoting the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute, the Trial
Chamber confirmed that ‘‘[t]he words ‘using’ and ‘participate’ have been adopted
in order to cover both direct participation in combat and also active participation in
military activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage and the use
of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints. It would not cover
activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or
the use of domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation’’ (emphasis added
by the Trial Chamber).51
Thus, according to the Trial Chamber, ‘‘active participation in hostilities’’ for
the purpose of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) is an intermediate notion between two other
categories. On the one hand, it is broader than ‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’,
as it includes some activities, which might be characterized as ‘‘indirect’’ partic-
ipation in hostilities (Sect. 4.3.2.1). On the other hand, it does not include forms of
51 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/
Add.1, 14 April 1998, p. 21, footnote 12.
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support to armed forces or groups, which are ‘‘clearly unrelated to the hostilities’’
(Sect. 4.3.2.2).
4.3.2.1 ‘‘Active’’ Versus ‘‘Direct’’ Participation in Hostilities
The Trial Chamber stressed in its judgment that ‘‘[t]he use of the expression ‘to
participate actively in hostilities’, as opposed to the expression ‘direct participa-
tion’ (as found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions) was clearly
intended to import a wide interpretation to the activities and roles that are covered
by the offence of using children under 15 actively to participate in hostilities’’
(para 627). The Chamber further supported this statement by arguing that the
notion of direct participation in hostilities is basically limited to functions ‘‘on the
front line’’ (para 628).
This position, however, does not take into account that both the notions of
active and direct participation in hostilities are not only used in relation to the
involvement of children in military operations, but have broader implications both
under international humanitarian law and criminal law. Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that all ‘‘[p]ersons taking no active part in
the hostilities’’ (emphasis added) must be treated humanely in all circumstances.
Similarly, the personal scope of application of Article 8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute
covers ‘‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’’. In addition, both treaty
and customary international humanitarian law provide that civilians are protected
against attack during armed conflict ‘‘unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities’’ (emphasis added).52 In the same way, the war crimes listed in
the Rome Statute include, both in relation to international and non-international
armed conflicts, ‘‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities’’ (emphasis
added) (Article 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i)).
Therefore, it is surprising that the Trial Chamber chose not to take these pro-
visions and related practice into account, or even to mention them, in giving its
own interpretation of the notions of active and direct participation in hostilities
within the framework of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. This is partic-
ularly surprising as the ‘‘chapeau’’ to this provision describes the crimes thereafter
listed as ‘‘serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character, within the established framework of international
law’’ (emphasis added). This suggests that the Trial Chamber should have at least
discussed this framework before proposing its own interpretation of the provision.
This would have been particularly welcome, as its interpretation partly differs from
the conclusions of recent in-depth research and expert discussions on these notions
in the framework of the law governing the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict.
52 API, Article 51(3); APII, Article 13(3); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r 6.
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Relevant work on this issue includes, most notably, the Interpretive Guidance
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humani-
tarian Law (Interpretive Guidance) issued by the ICRC in 2009.53 This document
draws on a variety of sources, such as the travaux préparatoires of relevant
treaties, international jurisprudence, military manuals, and legal doctrine. In
addition, it is based on discussions held during a series of meetings involving the
participation of experts from different backgrounds.54 It expresses, however, the
ICRC’s view on this topic and does not necessarily reflect the unanimous views of
participants.
If examined in the light of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, the Trial Chamber’s
reasoning is based at once on a broad definition of the notion of active participation in
hostilities, as well as a narrow understanding of the notion of direct participation in
hostilities. This interpretation may have undesirable consequences. It carries first the
risk of a loss of protection for the children whose situation is addressed in Article
8(2)(e)(vii). Second, it may allow the prosecution, under the Rome Statute, of acts
which are not prohibited under international humanitarian law.
It is, of course, not possible to give a comprehensive account of the legal
argumentation and conclusions contained in the Interpretative Guidance in the
limited framework of this article. Suffice it to stress first that this document recalls
that persons ‘‘taking no active part in the hostilities,’’ in the sense of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are mentioned in the equally
authentic French text of the same provision as persons ‘‘qui ne participent pas
directement aux hostilities’’ (emphasis added). This suggests that the terms
‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘active’’ were intended to have the same meaning at the time of the
adoption of the Conventions. The ICRC confirms that these terms ‘‘refer to the
same quality and degree of individual participation in hostilities’’.55
The broader understanding adopted by the Trial Chamber for the notion of
‘‘active’’ participation in hostilities is thus confusing and may potentially have a
negative impact on the children that Article 8(2)(e)(vii) intends to protect. This
interpretation may be used to justify extending the circle of persons who can be the
object of legitimate attacks under international humanitarian law.56 In addition, it
also tends to limit the number of individuals protected by Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and Article 8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, as these provisions
apply to persons taking ‘‘no’’ active part in the hostilities.57 The Special Court for
53 Melzer Melzer 2009.
54 Ibid., p. 9.
55 Ibid., p. 43. See also M. Happold, who reaches the same conclusion on the basis of Resolution
2675 of the UN General Assembly and jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR. Happold 2009,
pp. 594–595.
56 Graf 2012, p. 963.
57 Urban 2012.
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Sierra Leone had already remarked in this regard that ‘‘an overly expansive def-
inition of active participation in hostilities would be inappropriate as its conse-
quence would be that children associated with armed groups lose their protected
status as persons hors de combat under the law of armed conflict’’.58
Additionally, according to the Interpretive Guidance, an act amounting to
‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’ is composed of three cumulative elements: a) it
must be likely to reach a certain threshold of harm, b) there must be ‘‘a relationship
of direct causation between the act and the expected harm’’, and c) it must be
‘‘specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support
of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another’’ (belligerent nexus).59
With regard to the second requirement (direct causation), the ICRC further
explains that the expected harm must be brought about ‘‘in one causal step’’.60
Such a relationship of direct causation is present not only in cases where the act
itself is intended to reach the required threshold of harm, but also when it is an
integral part of a coordinated military operation designed to reach this threshold.61
This means that the notion of ‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’ is not limited
solely to the use of weapons during combat operations. It also includes conduct
which, taken in isolation, would not meet the required threshold of harm, but
which, in conjunction with other acts, would contribute to reaching that
threshold.62
As a consequence, the definition adopted by the ICRC is broader than the one
used by the Trial Chamber. Some acts amounting to ‘‘direct participation in
hostilities’’ under the Interpretive Guidance would not be considered as such by
the Chamber. Conduct comprising acts such as scouting, spying, or sabotage,
which are mentioned as ‘‘active participation in military activities linked to
combat’’ in the Lubanga judgment, would certainly amount to ‘‘direct participation
in hostilities’’ under the criteria proposed by the ICRC.63
Without further explanation, the position adopted by the Trial Chamber on this
point raises a number of questions. It is not clear whether this position suggests
that a legal concept could be interpreted in different ways when used in relation to
distinct provisions of the same legal instrument. If so, this would imply that the
International Criminal Court would have to give a certain meaning to the notion of
‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’ to interpret Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and
8(2)(b)(xxvi) (use of children under 15) on the one hand, and a separate distinct
58 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, Gbao (RUF Case), SCSL-04-15-
T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, 2 March 2009, para 1723.
59 Melzer 2009, pp. 46–64.
60 Ibid., p. 53.
61 Ibid., pp. 51–55.
62 Ibid., pp. 54–55. Example of such conduct include ‘‘the identification and marking of targets,
the analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces, and the instruction and
assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific military operation’’; see Melzer Meler
2009, p. 55.
63 See Urban 2012.
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meaning to the same notion as it appears in Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i)
(principle of distinction in the conduct of hostilities) on the other. The alternative,
i.e., a single, consistent understanding of the notion of ‘‘direct participation in
hostilities’’ in the framework of the Rome Statute, would be problematic. It would
confirm the existence of different interpretations of this notion under international
criminal law and international humanitarian law respectively. This would have
unwelcome practical consequences. Combatants targeting civilians would risk
being prosecuted and sentenced by the International Criminal Court, in application
of Articles 8(2)(b)(i) or 8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute, while such conduct would not
necessarily be prohibited under international humanitarian law. This would happen
each time that acts carried out by these civilians would be considered as amounting
to ‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’ under international humanitarian law, but not
under the Rome Statute.64
These uncertainties are unfortunate, especially because comparing ‘‘active’’ and
‘‘direct’’ participation in hostilities was not necessary for the purposes of the
judgment. It would have been sufficient to clarify the distinction between acts that
amount to ‘‘active’’ participation in hostilities, and those that do not, i.e. those that
are ‘‘clearly unrelated to the hostilities’’. In other words, it would have been
sufficient to focus the analysis on the threshold of application of the third offense
mentioned in Article 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statute.
4.3.2.2 ‘‘Active Participation in Hostilities’’ Versus ‘‘Activities Clearly
Unrelated to the Hostilities’’
With respect to this threshold of application, the Trial Chamber noted that the
‘‘decisive factor […] in deciding if an ‘indirect’ role is to be treated as active
participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child to the
combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target’’ (para 628). The
Chamber thus identified the following two ‘‘combined factors’’ to determine when
the use of a child under fifteen amounts to a war crime under the Rome Statute: a)
the child’s support to combatants; b) the ‘‘level of consequential risk’’ the child is
exposed to (para 628). The Chamber further explained in this regard that assess-
ments of particular situations, informed by these two criteria, must be made ‘‘on a
case-by-case basis’’ (para 628). The use of these two combined factors is in line
with the view that the notion of ‘‘active participation in hostilities’’ is not limited to
front line functions. These factors allow for a broad definition of this notion, as
they potentially include activities that are rather remotely linked to the hostilities.
One could therefore ask whether the Trial Chamber perhaps went too far down
this path.
With regard to the first factor, the concept of ‘‘support’’ seems so broad that it
may include almost all forms of contact that a child may have with armed forces or
64 Ibid.
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groups. The Trial Chamber recognized that, in practice children ‘‘are involved in a
myriad of roles that support combatants’’ (para 628). Activities carried out in this
regard do not need to be likely to reach a certain threshold of harm, as would be the
case with the notion of ‘‘direct participation in hostilities’’.65 Moreover, the Trial
Chamber did not seek to define any particular causal relationship between such
activities and actual combat operations. Neither did it require that the children
concerned have any particular intention to play, or even awareness of playing, a role
in the hostilities. ‘‘Support to combatants’’ is sufficient, regardless of the ultimate
purpose of the concerned activities. Therefore the first criterion used by the Trial
Chamber does not help to differentiate between activities amounting to ‘‘active
participation in hostilities’’ and those that are ‘‘clearly unrelated to the hostilities’’.
The second factor proposed by the Trial Chamber provides further guidance in
this regard. It identifies the level of risk to the children resulting from the support
to combatants as the relevant link between the use of children and the hostilities. It
is not clear, however, how such risk must be assessed in practice or, in the words
of the Chamber, how to determine when a child is exposed to ‘‘real danger as a
potential target’’ (para 628). It may be argued first that children taking an active
part in hostilities should include at the very least those that are legitimate military
targets under international humanitarian law. These are members of regular State
armed forces (with the exception however of medical and religious personnel)66 or
of other armed groups or units belonging to the State, as well as members of
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups.67 In addition, as previ-
ously mentioned, legitimate military targets also include civilians taking a direct
part in hostilities, for the duration of such participation only.
Second, the Trial Chamber’s reference to the ‘‘level of consequential risk’’ also
suggests that ‘‘active participation in hostilities’’ includes persons who cannot be
considered legitimate targets under international humanitarian law, but who are in
such a situation as to make them potential victims of an attack in practice. This
could include a category of children who are not members of State armed forces,
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups, but who are in another
way ‘‘associated with’’ such forces or groups. Their use would constitute a war
crime each time that they were exposed to a certain level of risk on the basis of
criteria that must still be specified. One relevant criterion in this regard could be,
for instance, the level of proximity to military objectives. The use of a child under
65 Melzer 2009, p. 47.
66 GCI, Article 24-26; GCII, Article 36; GCIV, Article 20; API, Article 15; Henckaerts and
Doswald-Beck 2005, r 3 and 25.
67 According to the ICRC, individual membership in an organized armed group other than
dissident armed forces includes any person assuming ‘‘a continuous function for the group
involving his or her direct participation in hostilities’’ (‘‘continuous combat function’’); see
Melzer 2009, pp. 21–25, 32–34.
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15 would amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute each time that such use
occurs in the vicinity of a military objective.68
It is not obvious, however, that Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute should
really apply to this last category. Relevant conduct may be so remotely linked to
the hostilities that it may hardly be categorized as ‘‘active participation’’. The
reason for this is that the second factor used by the Trial Chamber does not focus
on the nature of the activities carried out by the children, but rather on the context
in which these activities take place or, in other words, on factual elements resulting
in the risk that the children are exposed to real danger as potential targets. The
definition of ‘‘active participation in hostilities’’ therefore depends on the cir-
cumstances surrounding every single situation, opening the notion up to include
almost any form of support given to armed forces or groups.
The Chamber itself seems to be hesitant in this regard. Its approach based on
the two factors discussed above appears to be at odds with the categories presented
in the beginning of its analysis, namely ‘‘direction participation in hostilities’’,
‘‘active participation in hostilities’’, and ‘‘activities clearly unrelated to the hos-
tilities’’. Using these factors means that it is not possible to identify, in the abstract,
activities belonging to the third category. Yet, the Trial Chamber gives examples
of such activities, namely ‘‘food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff
in an officer’s married accommodation’’. Following the logic presented with regard
to the two factors, such activities could, however, amount to ‘‘active participation
in hostilities’’ depending on the resulting ‘‘level of consequential risk’’ involved.
These activities may indeed take place close to combat areas, where risks of being
targeted are high.
The lack of clarity on this point is similarly evident in elements of the Trial
Chamber’s analysis of the facts of the case. With regard to domestic work for
instance, the Chamber first made a clear reference to the two combined factors. It
stated that domestic work amounted to a war crime under the Rome Statute ‘‘when
the support provided by the girl exposed her to danger by becoming a potential
target’’ (para 882). However, in the same paragraph, the Trial Chamber also
emphasized that the girls concerned were used for domestic work, ‘‘in addition to
the other tasks they carried out as UPC/FPLC soldiers, such as involvement in
combat, joining patrols and acting as bodyguards’’. It is therefore unclear whether
the Trial Chamber considered that domestic work as such might amount to ‘‘active
participation in hostilities’’ if it involved risks of being targeted, or whether this is
the case in this instance because the girls were also involved in other activities
acquiring the required threshold of danger.69
68 See Article 58(a) of API, which requires Parties to international armed conflicts to endeavor to
remove civilians under their control ‘‘from the vicinity of military objectives’’. See also
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, r 24.
69 The same question was raised regarding the use of children for sexual purposes, but the Trial
Chamber did not take a position on this issue, stressing that this practice was not included in the
decision on the confirmation of charges (para 629). Judge Odio Benito however, in her separate
and dissenting opinion, suggested that sexual violence should have been included in a
82 S. Vité
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-924-5_4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Bilkent University Library, on 11 Jul 2018 at 11:44:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
4.4 Conclusion
The Lubanga judgment was an occasion for the International Criminal Court to
take a position on a number of crucial issues, thus providing legal guidance for its
future work and for the development of international criminal law. With respect to
some of these issues, the Trial Chamber drew on the well-established practice of
other international jurisdictions, most notably the ICTY. It endorsed, for instance,
the criteria and reasoning developed by the Tribunal to define non-international
armed conflict, and to determine the point at which such a conflict could become
international owing to foreign intervention. Thus, a significant contribution of the
Lubanga judgment consists of importing such previous practice into the system of
the Rome Statute.
The judgment is also important because the Trial Chamber settled certain issues
that have recently been debated. It reaffirmed that the fundamental distinction
between international and non-international armed conflicts remains an essential
feature of both international criminal and humanitarian law. It also indicated that
Articles 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute do not define different material
scopes of application despite their differences in wording. The expression ‘‘pro-
tracted armed conflict’’ in Article 8(2)(f) therefore does not create a higher
threshold of application for that provision.
The most innovative part of the judgment relates to the involvement of children
in armed conflicts. The Trial Chamber clarified fundamental concepts and pro-
posed new criteria for the application of the relevant provisions of the Rome
Statute. It adopted a broad definition of the notions of conscription and enlistment,
stressing that the purpose of the integration of children into armed forces or groups
is not relevant. It thus followed an approach that is legally correct and certainly
abides by the principle of the best interests of the child. On the other hand, its
reasoning concerning the war crime of using children under 15 to participate
actively in hostilities is subject to more controversy. This reasoning ignores recent
key developments related to the notion of participation in hostilities (both active
and direct) under international humanitarian law and may potentially weaken the
protection enjoyed by these children under existing rules. Moreover, the two
combined factors adopted by the Chamber do not appear to be precise enough to
really facilitate the identification of a clear threshold of application of the relevant
notion of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, and may therefore undermine
the predictability of this rule.
(Footnote 69 continued)
comprehensive legal definition of recruitment and active participation of children in hostilities,
and as such should have been addressed in the Lubanga Judgment (paras 6–8). On this specific
issue, see Aptel 2012; Graf 2012, pp. 965–966.
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